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Philosophy of religion, once taken out of determined contexts such as 
seventeenth century Cambridge, eighteenth century salons or contemporary analytic 
departments, is an elusive notion. In this book it covers all discourse on God and 
creation, be it theological, religious or philosophic. However, the definition that Paul 
Richard Blum puts forward is simple: “philosophy of religion is theology for non-
believers” (p. vii). Given that much of the book is concerned with philosophical 
projects that sought, in one way or another, a rationalization of the revelation, – which 
displayed a level of anthropocentrism that sometimes went beyond what Christian 
theology was willing to accommodate – the book stays true to the definition given. 
Blum’s thesis is that, “although no philosophy is without antecedents,” a specific 
dialectical relationship between theology (which discusses the reality of the existence 
of God), philosophy (the unengaged treatment of the concept of God, abstracted 
from its reality) and religion (the expression of faith in human practice) “is the 
achievement of Renaissance thought of the fourteenth through to the sixteenth 
century” (p. vii). His investigation will thus uncover the overlapping and delimitations 
of the areas of competence of these three fields, in a narrative meant to show that a 
specific equilibrium between them came into place in the Renaissance. It implies that 
the development of modern day philosophy of religion had its origin in the 
restructuration of Latin natural theology (praeambula fidei), brought about by new 
inquiries into the historicity of religion carried out by Renaissance thinkers.  
 This is an important contribution aiming to fill a gap in Renaissance studies. 
Standard Anglophone textbooks either ignore the field (e.g. The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy)1or are insufficient for someone looking for an overview (e.g. The 
Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy).2Perhaps owing to the sheer diversity of 
doctrines, the history of Renaissance philosophy is still dominated by the model of 
collected studies on individual authors. This book is no exception, being composed of 
independent chapters on specific figures, each presented from different and original 
perspectives that presuppose and should complement standard comprehensive 
accounts. It displays both minute philosophical, theological or philological analysis 
and insightful general claims. What we get is a rich panorama of ideas related to the 
concept of God that marks the expected luxuriant audacities of the Renaissance era, 
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while avoiding the usual pedagogical limitations of periodization. Topics cover the 
rationalization of the concept of God, theological arcana such as the mystery of the 
Trinity, the limits of reason, the politics of religion, metaphysical and epistemological 
themes, logic and language or ancient mythology, in authors from the thirteenth to the 
late sixteenth century. One common denominator of these studies is the effort of 
appropriation of non-Christian knowledge and its incorporation into Christianity. The 
author ecumenically avoids seeing in this development the germs of secularization; 
after all, Saint Augustine or Saint Thomas too had access to ancient wisdom.   
 The first chapter, on faith, reason and fideism from Lull to Montaigne, sets 
the tone for what it means to do philosophy of religion in the Renaissance. Raymond 
Lull, is seen as the pioneer who “introduced the basics of modern thought” by 
achieving a reduction of the epistemological gap between creation and God through 
the use of combinatory logic. But this is not the chapter’s focus. Lull’s project is 
insightfully presented through his apologetics and his plea for Christian missionarism. 
A detailed investigation of his petition to Pope Boniface VIII to step up missionary 
efforts, a call to use the double sword of the church, reveals the earthly motivations 
for his unification of the celestial and the practical. This line of argument for praxis is 
motivated through a presentation of Lull’s ontological analysis of the dignities of God. 
Applying linguistic performance to God’s attributes considered as rationes reales, Lull 
forges a concept of the dignities of God as active essences that are inherently and 
practically productive. The political activity (in this case militarized evangelization) is a 
direct translation of the productivity of the essences of God. The consequence is that 
the mystery of the ontological composition of God is submitted to a natural 
epistemology, thus putting it on a par with other aspects of nature.  
The chapter progresses somewhat unexpectedly to the Natural Theology of 
Raymond Sebond and to his famous critique by Montaigne, who plays the voice of 
common sense and reaffirms the intellectual infirmity of the human mind, but without 
leaving the subtleties of Sebond’s thought unacknowledged. The author underscores 
the distinction between Lull’s and Sebond’s projects, both confident in the 
intelligibility of God and his creation, and Montaigne’s profound skepticism. Cusanus 
is read through the eyes of a late sixteenth century intellectual, Pietro Bongo, who 
published a book on numerology inspired by him (Numerorum Mysteria, 1599). Bongo’s 
project was to demonstrate the compatibility of Pythagorean numerology with 
Christianity. The chapter progresses from showing the presence of Cusanian ideas in 
this text to Cusanus’s own technical numerological speculations from his sermons. 
These speculations, instead of being cast out into medieval mysticism, are integrated 
into a coherent programme for capturing the connection between the intellect and the 
world through numbers.  
 A big part of the effort of Renaissance Christian thinkers was one of 
accommodation of pagan ancient mythology to the tenets of the Christian faith. This 
effort is traced in the chapter on Coluccio Salutati. But the reverse was perhaps a 
more interesting challenge: to show in what way ancient mythology illuminates 
Christianity itself. This could have been the project of the enigmatic Georgios 
Gemistos Plethon, if he hadn’t gone too far. His extreme trajectory spanned from 
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Constantinople to Florence, from Aristotelianism to Platonism and from Christianity 
to neo-paganism. Plethon is introduced through a curious reference from Ficino’s 
translation of Plotinus quoting him as one of the few reliable interpreters of Aristotle, 
on a par with Themistius, Simplicius, Prophyry or Avicenna. Not to mention that 
Ficino claims in this text the same status of sound Aristotelians for himself and Pico! 
The chapter studies Plethon’s treatise Νόμωνσυγγραφή, a reformatory book that drew 
heavily on ancient and esoteric knowledge. A reply to Plato’s Laws, Plethon’s aim is a 
theory of the political and moral implications of religion, in a marked anthropological 
vein: in order to reach beatitude, a study of man is required, and a study of man 
requires a study of nature. But in order to even begin to do so, Plethon invokes the 
help of the Gods and launches in an elaborated syncretic mythology that is difficult to 
assess as genuine or metaphoric. In the tribulations of the Orthodox Church between 
the Scylla of the Ottoman Empire and the Charybdis of the Roman Church, Plethon’s 
treatise suggests an attempt to revive Byzantine culture through the restoration of 
ancient mythology combined with Zoroastrianism. This did not stop his former 
disciple, Georgios Gennadios Scholarios, who became Ecumenical Patriarch of fallen 
Constantinople, from partially destroying it. Instead of dwelling on the question of 
Plethon’s alleged neo-paganism, the author helpfully goes beyond, into the moral and 
political scope of the treatise and presents it as a work of instruction on societal order. 
In this light, his restoration of ancient mythology is subordinated to a project of 
rational philosophy, thus making the Byzantine sage a forerunner of Spinoza or 
Helvetius: the purpose of religion is to serve the perfection of morals. Plethon’s 
carefully assembled theogony is an exercise in applying scholastic Aristotelian and 
Platonist metaphysical concepts to forge a rational mythology. His theology becomes 
an experimental endeavour of self-reconstruction. 
 It would be an unjust effort to try to summarize all the tight analyses 
proposed in this book, spanning from Lorenzo Valla’s re-evaluation of language 
combined with Pauline piety, to the Carmelite Giovanni Battista Spagnoli 
Mantovano’s anti-Thomist historicism, or to Bruno’s systematic struggles with 
theological speculation. Two central projects for the integration of ancient sources 
into Christianity are those of Ficino and Pico. The author offers new insights into 
traditional topics such as the Ficinian hierarchy of beings, the notion of oneness and 
Ficino’s concept of religion. However abstract Ficino’s appropriation of Platonism 
may seem, the author recognizes the anthropocentric tendency in a theology that 
makes the ascent to the divine an essential feature of humanity. A counterpart to this 
direction is given by the chapter on Pico, focused on the Florentine quarrel on 
Platonic love. Pico’s critique of Ficino and neo-paganism, his lucidity in receiving 
Platonism and discerning its incompatibility with Christianity was a welcome 
complement to the general Platonic enthusiasm of the era. The chapter on 
Campanella brings this lucidity to the level of a philosophical system that integrated 
Christian tenets and achieved perhaps the best justification for a Renaissance 
philosophy of religion.   
The substantial chapter on Francisco’s Suárez’s noetics and divine ideas is a 
welcome addition to the dynamic Suárezian literature. The author’s aim is to highlight 
 
 
 
Society and Politics                                                              Vol. 6, No. 2 (12)/November 2012 
 
127 
 
the combination of a Platonic notion of ideas, received via Saint Thomas, with 
Aristotelian metaphysics, and thus picture Suárez as a mediator between the two main 
currents of the sixteenth century, namely scholastic Aristotelianism and Renaissance 
Neoplatonism. The innovation of this analysis in placing Suarez in the context of 
Renaissance neoplatonism deserves praise; it is high time that scholars looked at the 
two currents together and acknowledge their contemporaneity. One tendency of the 
Neoplatonic authors presented in the previous chapters, such as Ficino or 
Campanella, was to rely on the medieval scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals in 
order to put a Platonic epistemology in place. Blum shows that this appropriation 
tended to displace the notion of transcendentals from a predicative notion to the 
ontological claim that one transcendental just is God (the idea of oneness is 
assimilated both to the transcendental one and to the One). Suárez reacts to this 
tendency by reaffirming the predicative nature of transcendentals: properties do not 
equal being. This reaction of reinforcing an orthodox doctrine is taken to show that 
Suárez was aware of the contemporary Neoplatonic interpretation of transcendentals. 
Following this Platonic vein, the author presents Suárez’s original 
conceptualization of divine ideas as forms “destined towards realization” (p. 171). 
True forms and not just beings of reason, divine ideas are for Suárez a formal concept 
that represents things as “susceptible to be created” (ut repraesentat creaturas factibiles), 
the very property that makes them divine ideas co-eternally present. Blum’s nuanced 
analysis shows how the Suárezian conceptualization of divine ideas can transcend the 
Aristotelian critique of their reality by positing a new type of being independent of the 
condition of reality – the type of being of “a concept that encompasses the 
nonexistence of the essence as potentially realized” (p. 171). Suárez overcomes the 
famous Aristotelian critique of ideas by using the very Aristotelian notion of 
potentiality, I would add. One notable fruit of this endeavour is the interpretation of 
the Aristotelian ens qua ens in terms of dependency on the Creator: ens qua factibile. The 
knowledge of this dependency is precisely what the viator can attain in the knowledge 
of things. Suárez’s magisterial display of a profound assimilation of Greek philosophy 
into Christianity is an inspired choice for ending a book on the Renaissance.  
This is an intelligently constructed book and a scholarly tour de force that will 
bring joy to Renaissance scholars. In spite of the necessarily selective choice of figures 
and themes, it sets itself up as the most comprehensive treatment of Renaissance 
thinking on religion to date. The question remains whether this thinking represented a 
specific cultural achievement of the Renaissance; the epilogue of the book tries to 
situate this ethos in a multi-strategic effort to overcome conflicting truth claims about 
religion. One could claim that such an effort is inherent to the historical development 
of religious praxis. Some historians have argued that the assimilation of foreign 
doctrines and religious expression is an essential trait of Christianity, its via romana. 
Whatever the contribution of humanism to dramatically enhance the reception of 
antiquity may have been, the Renaissance certainly didn’t suffer from a culture shock 
that would have demanded an excess of rationalization or relativism. The articulation 
between philosophy, theology and religion in classical Latin Christianity favoured a 
hierarchical model of disciplines that refused conflict. Philosophical doctrines were to 
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be used to the extent that they helped the ascent to the theological knowledge of the 
truth of faith, one that religious practice expressed. Church fathers and medieval 
doctors were not so vacillating in their confrontation with antiquity because of their 
ecumenical belief that Greek or Arab wisdom could be distilled and fructified by 
gently orienting it towards revelation. The truth of faith neither replaced nor 
antagonized the truth of philosophy; it simply completed it – it made it better. When 
going through the rich picture of Renaissance projects offered in this book, one gets 
the sense that it is this side of the story that is missing in a narrative about the birth of 
the philosophy of religion, namely the non-conflictual, hierarchical and symbiotic 
articulation between philosophy, theology and practice. Perhaps this is so because 
philosophy of religion was born with the expense of an erosion of this understanding.  
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